A Sign of the Times: Balancing Freedom of Expression and Community Standards

Overview

In Charles Frederick Armstrong v The Township of Russell (2025 ONSC 3790), Justice Flaherty struck down key parts of a municipal bylaw that restricted election signs. The Court held the bylaw infringed Mr. Armstrong's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter).

Summary of the Facts

Mr. Armstrong was the successful candidate in the Township of Russell's (Township) municipal by-election in 2024.

Bylaw 2016-062 placed several restrictions on when and where election signs could be erected (paras. 6-7). For instance:

• Election signs could not be erected more than 30 days prior to the election;

• The signs could not be placed on public property (parks); and

• The signs could not be placed near a road or near other candidates’ signs.

Applying the bylaw in 2024, candidates were permitted to post election signs starting August 31st (para. 8) but Mr. Armstrong displayed 14 signs for his campaign between August 2nd and August 8th (para. 9). Nine of Mr. Armstrong’s signs were removed by the Township, and having breached the bylaw, he was ordered to pay a fine to have his signs returned (paras. 11-12).

Councillor Armstrong brought an application alleging the bylaw was unconstitutional because its restrictions on when and where election signs could be displayed violated his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter (para. 2). The Township argued the bylaw was content-neutral and aimed at the location and timing of the expression to prevent physical intrusions (para. 26).

Key Takeaways

1. Restrictions on Election Signs Violated Section 2(b) of the Charter

The Court held that the restrictions on election signs are tied to the content of the expression and violate s. 2(b) (para. 30). Flaherty J. found that the election sign restrictions had more than just a physical effect (para. 28). By restricting when and where election signs could go up, the Township violated Mr. Armstrong’s freedom of expression under s. 2(b).

2. The Restrictions on Freedom of Expression were not Justified under s. 1 of the Charter

Section 1 of the Charter allows for a government to justify infringing on a Charter right (para. 33). A municipality can justify election sign restrictions if it can be shown that:

• The bylaw has a pressing and substantial objective;

• The bylaw is rationally connected to those objectives;

• The bylaw minimally impairs the freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter; and

• There is proportionality between the effects and the objects of the bylaw.

Although Mr. Armstrong conceded the bylaw's objective was both pressing and substantial and rationally connected to the objectives (para. 34), there was no evidence the Township had searched for a minimally impairing solution. The Township's argument that other municipalities had adopted similar restrictions was not convincing (para. 39). Moreover, the Township did not sufficiently demonstrate why election signs required more rigorous restrictions than other types of signs such as those promoting real estate sales or community events (para. 41). As such, the Court held that the bylaw’s restrictions were not minimally impairing.

3. The Bylaw’s Benefits were not Proportionate

The Court rejected the Township's argument that the bylaw’s benefits were proportionate to the harm (para. 43). The bylaw restricted political expression at its most important time, i.e. during an election campaign (para. 44). There was also a dual effect. By limiting the display of election signs, the Township was also limiting when citizens could express their political views by displaying election signs on private property (para. 45). Similarly, there was no evidence that the more restrictive approach advanced the bylaw's stated objectives (para. 46).

4. The Township was Unjustly Enriched

Flaherty J. found the Township had been unjustly enriched by the $450 fine (para. 49). In requiring payment of the fine, the Township relied on a provision of the bylaw that was found to be unconstitutional. Thus, there was no justification for the enrichment.

Election Signs are Protected Under S.2(b)

Armstrong v The Township of Russell fits with previous decisions that restrictions on election signs can unfairly limit free expression. In Shurman v Vaughan (2007 CanLII 82793 (ON SC)), the Court held that strict time limits for posting election signs disproportionately limited freedom of expression. In that case, a blanket prohibition applied to citizens and candidates, which greatly affected citizens’ ability to post election signs on their properties.

In Ramsden v Peterborough (City of) (1993 CanLII 60 (SCC)), the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a bylaw prohibiting all postering on public property on the grounds that the bylaw infringed freedom of expression. In finding the bylaw was unconstitutional, the Court found that the restrictions on postering had more than just physical consequences; they resulted in a restriction of freedom of expression.

Implications for Municipalities

This decision has direct implications for how municipalities should write, apply, and update bylaws regulating signs.

• Consider tailored bylaws that focus more on safety and sightlines than content. Political expression is an important cornerstone of our democracy, so it ought not to be restricted more than retail or event signs, for example. 

• If restrictions are necessary, ensure they are the least restrictive. Restrictions tied to a broader purpose such as preservation of public spaces or environmental concerns will likely be more justified than restrictions that specifically dictate when and where signs may be posted.

• Critically assess current approaches. Municipalities that stipulate a short pre-election window or blackout periods should consider whether those rules address a proven problem. Could a longer window work? Municipalities need to explain why the chosen or amended rules are the least restrictive way to meet a goal (e.g. safety).

• Build a supporting evidentiary basis. This may include collecting traffic safety data, cleanliness data, environmental reports, complaints, and enforcement results. Train municipal staff on appropriate bylaw enforcement procedures and be sure to document decisions. Consistent enforcement, written reasons for removals, and fair fee practices matter.

Conclusion

This decision provides helpful guidance for municipalities seeking to balance the tension between community standards and freedom of expression, particularly as it relates to election sign regulation.